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ABSTRACT 
 
PHP is one of the most commonly used languages to develop web sites because of its simplicity, easy to 
learn and it can be easily embedded with any of the databases. A web developer with his basic knowledge 
developing an application without practising secure guidelines, improper validation of user inputs leads to 
various source code vulnerabilities. Logical flaws while designing, implementing and hosting the web 
application causes work flow deviation attacks. In this paper, we are analyzing the complete behaviour of a 
web application through static and dynamic analysis methodologies. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Internet and web have made the entire world come together. Also now-a-days web is being used 
heavily to offer citizen services including banking and governance services. However, these 
advances in Internet technologies are being exploited to cause adverse effects. Vulnerabilities in 
web applications are used as vehicles to launch various attacks. According to Symantec survey 
report-2013 [1], small businesses and organizations are being targeted by attackers. Popular web 
application threats according to OWASP [2] include SQL injection [3], Cross-Site Scripting 
(XSS) [4], Authentication and Authorization bypass [5][6], Session Hijacking [7], Cross-Site 
Request Forgery (CSRF) [8]. Most popular threat among these is SQL injection, which targets 
backend database through the web application. The attackers make use of the compromised web 
applications and acquire unauthorized access to the database. The [9] shows the risk factors of top 
10 attacks incurred on specific application or organization’s technical impact and business 
impacts. 
 
XSS attack is launched by injecting malicious code through user supplied data. Popularly this 
attack is made through java script code; attacker gives malicious web link in user input field 
which internally calls or redirects to the web link supplied by the attacker. CSRF is another 
dangerous attack in which the attacker inserts malicious links in the forms or forums of a 
legitimate website which tempt users to click on those links leading to malicious activity.  
 
Another attack is “Session Hijacking” where the attacker focuses more on finding the weaknesses 
in session implementation. By using session fixation, prediction and capture methods attacker 
gets session information which can be misused. The session fixation [10] occurs when an attacker 
is able to trick the user in using a predefined session ID of his choice. Usually the session ID is 
passed as URL parameter along with the requested page information from the client. If the web 
server fills the session details with the predefined session ID from the client without regenerating 
a new session ID then there is a possibility of attack. Another possible attack is sequence bypass 
attack, where an attacker is able to access the unauthorized pages with the same privileges or by 
forcible browsing. 
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In addition to the above, Code Injection and command Execution are other popular attacks. In 
Code Injection attack, malicious code is added as part of the application itself, which gets 
executed when application is accessed. Shell code falls under this category. In Command 
Execution attack, attacker injects and executes commands through vulnerable applications. 
 
Configuration file settings are also exploited for launching the attacks. For example in PHP 
[11][12], if register_global is turned ‘on’ in configuration file it automatically takes data from the 
super global arrays ($_GET, $_POST, $_SERVER, $_COOKIE, $_REQUEST and $_FILE) and 
assigns them to global variables, means $_POST['password'] would automatically assigned to 
global variable $password. These global variable details are used by attacker to gain unauthorized 
access to the application. All these attacks are made by compromising either web application or 
exploiting the configuration details of .config files. In order to protect from these attacks, various 
research efforts are made in developing browser side as well as web application side security 
solutions. Through this paper we represent PROP- PatROnage of PHP Web Applications, which 
analyzes and detects the source code vulnerabilities and prevents the run time execution attacks. 
This security solution is implemented and tested for PHP based web application and results are 
promising. 
 
2. EXISTING SOLUTIONS 
 
In order to detect & prevent web application attacks, source code as well as run time analysis 
approaches [13] [14] [15] are used. Existing solutions pixy [16], rips [17], MIMOSA [18] and 
IBM Rational AppScan [19] require scripting code of web application in order to detect the 
vulnerabilities. Swaddler [20] is a solution, in which vulnerabilities are detected by analyzing the 
state of web application based on session values at PHP interpreter level during runtime. Another 
solution Acunetix web vulnerability scanner [21], audits web applications by checking for 
exploitable hacking vulnerabilities through static analysis. Nemesis [22] approach addresses the 
Authentication and Authorization bypass attacks with programmer-supplied access control rules 
on files and database entries. To provide the security at web application level another possible 
solution is the use of Web Application Firewalls (WAF) [23]. But WAFs are designed by white 
listing the rules. The rule set of the WAFs describes the behaviour of the application. But these 
WAFs are failing to prevent the Session Hijacking; Privilege Escalation and Logical flaws exist 
in web applications due to the inability in white listing the rules of defected code and session 
maintenance. 
 
In this paper we propose PROP to detect source code vulnerabilities like XSS, SQL Injection, 
Code Injection, Command Injection , File Inclusion and File Manipulation attacks and to detect & 
prevents the work flow deviation attacks like SQL injection; authentication & authorization 
bypass through session stealing and sequence bypass attacks at run time execution. The solution 
works without disturbing the application database and without opening any external ports. 
 
3. APPROACH 
 
PROP includes Static Analyzer and Dynamic Analyzer which follows the source code analysis 
and run time analysis techniques respectively. Figure 1 shows the working functionality of PROP. 
Static Analyzer analyses the source code of PHP web application and detects the source code 
vulnerabilities. It maintains the vulnerability checklist which includes the identified native PHP 
vulnerable functions list and sources from which the vulnerabilities are exploited like user input, 
file and database access methods. Analysis starts by tokenizing the source code, parsing and 
identifying the vulnerabilities against provided vulnerable functions check list. And it generates a 
report on identified vulnerabilities and the report includes the information like how many files it 
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scanned, detected vulnerabilities list and total scanning time. Detected vulnerabilities list contains 
file name and line number of the vulnerability. It also saves the vulnerabilities report in pdf 
format for further analysis.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: PROP 
 
Dynamic Analyzer of PROP analyzes the run time execution flow by capturing the web 
communication. It captures web request and response messages along with the session flags. 
These details are collected to create a behaviour model of the web application and are stored in 
database at the server. Session flag in the model indicates the existence / non-existence of the 
session. This behaviour model is enforced at runtime along with the details like user agent and 
client IP address to detect the work flow deviation attacks. Figure 2 shows functionality of 
Dynamic Analyzer. 
 
PROP Dynamic Analyzer is carried out in two phases: Training Phase and Runtime Enforcement 
Phase. During the Training Phase, PROP monitors the web application behaviour in attack free 
environment. It uses the spidering technique [24] to crawl internally to each and every web page 
and generates profiles and constructs the model by covering the complete behaviour of the web 
application. During Runtime Enforcement Phase, along with the web request the user agent and 
client IP address are also monitored and model is enforced to detect work flow deviation attacks. 
The detected deviations are reported for further analysis. 
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Figure 2: Functionality of Dynamic Analyzer 
 
4. DESIGN LAYOUT 
 
4.1. Static analyzer 
 
PROP Static Analyzer performs 2 types of analysis: PHP Configuration file analysis and PHP 
source code analysis. PHP Configuration file analysis reads the native PHP configuration file 
(php.ini) and checks configured settings and display the mis-configured setting with current value 
and recommended value. 
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Figure 3: Functionality PHP Source code analyzer 
 
PHP Source code analyzer analyzes the source code, it first identifies and lists the vulnerable 
functions in the native PHP script which causes Cross-Site Scripting, SQL Injection, Command 
Injection, Code Injection, File Inclusion and File Manipulation vulnerabilities and also  lists 
secure functions to prevent these vulnerabilities from exploitation.  
 
To analyze the PHP source code, the PHP script is split into tokens. These tokens are used for 
further analysis. Each token is represented in an array with token identifier, the line number and 
token value. And tokens are analyzed against the configured vulnerable functions list, meanwhile 
it creates a dependency stack, a file stack, list of declared variables and several registers to 
indicate whether it is currently scanning a function, or class. If any vulnerable function is 
detected, it creates a new parent and it checks parameters of that function by backtracking. And if 
any vulnerable parameter found it adds as a child to that parent. And that node the details are sent 
to for reporting. Figure 3 shows the functionality of PHP Source code analyzer. The same 
procedure is repeated for all the tokens. And finally it displays the detected vulnerabilities and 
can be saved in pdf format.  Figure 4 shows the pdf report of Source code analyzer. 
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Figure 4: Sample pdf report 
 
4.2. Dynamic Analyzer 
 
Working functionality of the Training Phase and Runtime Enforcement Phase are as follows. 
 
4.2.1. Training Phase 
 
Figure 5 shows the PROP Dynamic Analyzer functioning at Training Phase with Profiler Engine 
and Model Generator modules. Profiler Engine captures the web communication for different 
roles. For each role Profiler Engine collects the web request in the form of request header 
information, records and passes to the web server. The response from the web server is forwarded 
to the web client. Along with the request and response information, Profiler Engine also records 
the sequence of web requests with respect to current and previous web request state.  
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Figure 5 : PROP Dynamic Analyzer functioning at Training Phase 
 
For each web request a separate communication id is created to differentiate between requests 
coming from web clients. And corresponding request header information is saved in a file with 
name “communicationid_request”. It also extracts the cookie id from the header to check the 
session existence.. The session flag for that request is saved in “communication id_Srequest” file 
name. And also sequence of pages crawled by each role user is saved in a “roleid.xml” file. For 
example, with request communication id to be 1, corresponding header information is saved in 
1_request and session flag is saved in 1_Srequestfile names. 
 
After recording the request information it forwards the request to the web server for processing. 
The response from the web server is collected and forwarded to the web client.   
 
Profiler Engine internally spiders each web page and collects the request and response 
information. Spider covers all the web pages internally for strengthening the model of the 
application. The same process is repeated for all the roles of the web application. 
 
Model generator is another module in Training Phase which works in offline mode. It analyzes 
the profile records based on the communication id and role, builds a relational model database for 
the particular web application behaviour. It first reads the “communicationid_request” file and 
creates a request id based on the method of calling and requested resource name. If requested 
URL is http://example.com/login.php using GET method, request id becomes GET_login.php. 
From the corresponding “communicationid_Srequest” file reads the session flag. Based on the 
profile records it creates Model database with 2 different types of model sets. 
 
Model set1 represents MySQL database table and each row contains communication id, request 
id, session flag and role. Figure 6 shows the Model set1. 
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Figure 6 : MySQL table with request, session flag and role 
 
Model set2 refers the list of web pages accessible by each role including web page sequence. 
Separate xml file is created for each role. Each tag in xml file other than a root element represents 
a page and list of possible accessible pages from that page. Figure 7 shows the 2 different xml 
sequence files for 2 different roles. 
 
From the Figure 7, role1 user can access analysis.php, report.php, view.php and search.php pages 
from home.php. For role2 management.php, report.php, view.php and search.php are accessible 
from the home.php. 
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Figure 7: Example of Sequence of pages accessed by role1 and role2 
 
4.2.2. Runtime Enforcement Phase 
 
During the enforcement phase, model is enforced and it continuously processes the web requests 
and web responses. It has Enforcement Engine and Verifier Engine. Figure 6 shows PROP 
Dynamic Analyzer functioning at Runtime Enforcement Phase. 
 
 
 
Figure 8 : PROP Dynamic Analyzer functioning at Runtime Enforcement Phase 
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Enforcement Engine (EE) captures the web request before hitting the web server directly. 
Captured request header information is sent to Verifier Engine. Verifier Engine (VE) checks the 
given request against model sets and sends the status of verification to the Enforcement Engine. If 
the request is a genuine behaviour of the application then the status represented as “don’t_block” 
otherwise if any deviations occur with respect to model sets then represents status as “block” and 
logs an error based on diversion. Depending on the verification status Enforcement Engine 
proceeds further. If status is “don’t_block” Enforcement Engine forwards the request to the web 
server application else it won’t send the request to the web server application and intimate the 
web client about the diversion. 
 
Verifier Engine first validates the web request information against Model Set1 which helps in 
finding authentication bypass attacks which generally happens in any vulnerable web application 
by changing the web page user input or by hijacking the session. Once the values satisfy the 
Model Set1 behaviour then it should go for next level of validation with respect to Model Set2 
otherwise VE sends the “block” status to the EE which stops the web communication. 
 
Once the authentication is done, the authorization check and sequence is verified with respect to 
Model Set 2. This verification addresses the vertical privilege escalation attacks where one role 
user is trying to access the pages of other roles and also addresses the sequence bypass attacks 
where the attacker is forcibly accessing the pages without following the sequence.  
 
Once the request is satisfied with 2 levels of verification then only VE sends the “dont_block” 
status to Enforcement Engine, from there the request is passd to the web server. Failure at any 
level in the verification process, leads to VE sending “block” status to the EE and logging the 
error. EE reject the request and sends the error page to the user. The same process is followed for 
all requests. 
 
5. IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS 
 
5.1. Static Analyzer 
 
PROP Static Analyzer is implemented with partial integration of open-source source code 
analysis tools Pixy, RIPS and PhpSecinfo. It targets PHP Configuration, XSS, SQL Injection, File 
Manipulation, File Inclusion, Command Injection and Code Injection related vulnerabilities in 
PHP based web applications. Also, it checks these vulnerabilities against user input, file and 
database related functions. After the complete scan of the web application it generates a well 
formed pdf report which will be useful for further analysis. The pdf report contains details about 
the scanned application name, time and date of the scan process and detected vulnerabilities 
information. 
 
5.2. Dynamic Analyzer 
 
5.2.1. Training Phase 
 
This phase generates the profile records by analyzing the request header information of each 
request. Request() captures the request and creates corresponding request profile files. 
 
Collected profile records are analyzed and model database is created for that web application. 
Model database is represented in the form MySQL table and xml files. MySQL table contains 
request information of each page with the combination of communication id, request id, session 
flag and role. And separate xml files are created for each role. The xml file contains the sequence 
of pages accessed by each role. 
 
International Journal of Computer Science & Information Technology (IJCSIT) Vol 7, No 2, April 2015 
 
121 
5.2.2. Runtime Enforcement Phase 
 
To analyze the application web requests coming from different web clients an apache module has 
been integrated with Runtime Enforcement Phase component of work flow analyzer. Apache 
module intercepts the request and sends the request to Verifier Engine for checking the requests 
against model database. Request is genuine, apache module forwards the same request to the web 
server otherwise blocks the request. IPC mechanism has been implemented between the Apache 
module and Verifier Engine. 
 
We are considering the user-agent, client IP of each web request for differentiating the web 
clients and verifying against Model databases. 
 
6. EXPERIMENTATION DETAILS 
 
6.1. Static Analyzer 
 
We have tested many applications with Static Analyzer and the details are mentioned below 
Table 1 
 
Table 1: Tested Applications with Static Analyzer 
 
Application Name Detected Vulnerabilities 
Portal 
SQL Injection 
File Manipulation 
Cross-site Scripting  
Scarf 
File Manipulation 
SQL Injection 
Cross-site Scripting  
CET Automation tool SQL Injection Cross-site scripting  
Bookstore SQL Injection Cross-site scripting  
Employee_dir 
SQL Injection 
Cross-site scripting 
File Manipulation  
 
6.2. Dynamic Analyzer 
 
We have taken a web application with 2 roles manager and employer. Each user is having access 
to different web pages depending on the role. Table 2 shows the requests being made to the web 
application are represented in MySQL table during Training Phase.  
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Table 2: Model Database 
 
S.No  Communication id  Request id  Session  Role  
0  1  GET_About.php  0  0  
1  2  GET_Help.php  0  0  
2  3  GET_Login.php  0  0           
3  4  POST_Login.php  0  0  
4  5  GET_Services.php  0  0  
5  6  GET_Products.php  0  0  
6  7  GET_home.php  1  manager  
7  8  GET_Assign_works.php  1  manager  
8  9  GET_User_mgmt.php  1  manager  
9  10  GET_Update_users.php  1  manager  
10  11  GET_Update_roles.php  1  manager  
11  12  GET_View.php  1  manager  
12  13  GET_Viewusers.php  1  manager  
13  14  GET_Viewroles.php  1  manager  
14  15  GET_Home.php  1  employer  
15  16  GET_work_report.php  1  employer  
16  17  GET_View.php  1  employer  
17  18  GET_Viewusers.php  1  employer  
18  19  GET_Viewroles.php  1  employer  
 
Table 3 & 4 shows the list of pages accessed and sequence of pages follows the current page by 
manager and employer respectively. For manager, possible list of pages accessible are Home.php, 
Assign_works.php, User_mgmt.php, View.php, Update_users.php, Update_roles.php, 
Viewusers.php and Viewroles.php. Viewusers.php & Viewroles.php can only accessible from 
View.php page. Means the user can not directly access the Viewusers.php from any of the page 
other than View.php. 
 
Table 3: Role- manager 
 
Current Page  Next accessible pages  
Home.php  Assign_works.php; User_mgmt.php; View.php  
User_mgmt.php  Update_users.php; Update_roles.php  
View.php  Viewusers.php; Viewroles.php  
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Table 4: Role-employer 
 
Current Page  Next accessible pages  
Home.php  Work_report.php; View.php  
View.php  Viewusers.php; Viewroles.php  
 
According to Table 4, employer can access Home.php, Work_report.php, View.php, 
Viewusers.php and Viewroles.php pages.  
 
7. PERFORMANCE DETAILS 
 
7.1. Dynamic Analyzer 
 
We deployed our security solution for PHP based web application and analyzed the performance. 
We tested the solution with observed page load time for different web pages by using lori add-on 
[25] installed in firefox with PROP Dynamic Analyzer Runtime Enforcement Phase and without 
PROP Dynamic Analyzer Runtime Enforcement Phase. With PROP, the curve is going slightly 
higher than without PROP because the runtime enforcement phase verifies each and every request 
against model sets and forwards the request to the web server. Figure 9 shows performance 
overhead with and without PROP. 
 
 
 
Figure 9 : Performance Overhead 
  
8. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper, we discussed about the PHP source code analysis through Static Analyzer, 
monitoring web application behaviour at run time and an approach for detecting and preventing 
workflow deviations through Dynamic Analyzer. PROP security solution identifies PHP source 
code vulnerabilities like XSS, SQL Injection, Code Injection, Command Injection, File Inclusion, 
File Manipulation and PHP configuration vulnerabilities with Static Analyzer component and 
authentication bypass, session hijacking and sequence bypass attacks with Dynamic Analyzer 
component. A pdf report has been generated to analyse the vulnerabilities details in case of Static 
Analyzer and deviation logs are maintained in case of Dynamic Analyzer. 
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Furthermore, it addresses the authorization bypass attack if users with role binding details are 
known in the prior. PROP Dynamic Analyzer has its own limitation like, it is able to detect and 
prevent Authorization bypass for different role users, but users within the same role is trying to 
bypass is not addressed. By checking the user's session at every page can address this issue. 
Another limitation is we are crawling the site by considering the href links and opening the 
authentication pages (login and logout pages) for different roles in a browser which may not 
cover all the web pages. If the web site is designed with form based actions where the manual 
interaction is mandatory to pass the parameters, automatic crawl may not encompass. To 
overcome this problem we are attempting to render the form action based pages in browser to 
collect the data from the user which aids to crawl to next page. 
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